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Abstract In this paper, we show that God is portrayed in the Hebrew Bible and in
the Rabbinic literature—some of the very Hebrew texts that have influenced the
three major world religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—as One who can be
argued with and even changes his mind. Contrary to fundamentalist positions, in the
Hebrew Bible and other Jewish texts God is omniscient but enjoys good, playful
argumentation, broadening the possibilities for reasoning and reasonability. Arguing
with God has also had a profound influence upon Jewish humor, demonstrating that
humans can joke with God. More specifically, we find in Jewish literature that
humor’s capacity to bisociate between different domains of human experience can
share a symbiotic relationship with argumentation’s emphasis on producing mul-
tiple, contested perspectives. Overall, once mortals realize that figures such as God
can accept many perspectives through humor, teasing, arguing, criticism, and in at
least one case, even lawsuits, a critical point emerges: citizens should learn to live,
laugh, and reason with others with whom they disagree.
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Since God can be austere and punishing, religious fundamentalists of all stripes may
take offense at the very notion of including the topics of God, humor, and argument in
the same breath. Yet a review of ancient Hebrew texts—some of the very texts that
have influenced the three major world religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—
tells a different story. If God has a sense of humor, can be argued with, and can even
change His mind, values such as mercy, the acceptance of others’ shortcomings, and
collaborative engagement with diverse people should be important for faith
communities following Hebraic traditions. Ultimately, mortals should be prepared
to argue and laugh in unity rather than go to war over differences.
This paper contributes to the ongoing effort to construct productive norms for
human communication and deliberation, following calls for examining inductive,
‘‘interactive’’ and ‘‘emergent’’ models that can provide important guides for public
argument (Hicks 256; Freelon; Black). In particular, argumentation scholars have
continued to search for and advance the argumentative structures and processes best
suited to humanity’s future—as in Combs’s comparison of the differing argumen-
tative styles and assumptions in Daoist and Greek debate, and Liu’s analysis of
practices like ‘‘cross-arguing,’’ where ‘‘two contending sides … each try to justify
[their] position in the other party’s terms’’ (309; see also Dreyfus). Exploring and
constructing norms from religious spheres has remained equally important to this
research trajectory. Goodnight clarifies that one of Habermas’s main concerns has
been ‘‘to transform the ‘telos of reaching understanding’ developed in religious
traditions to the secular, argumentative realm of making informed, meaningful,
collaborative life choices’’ (103; see also Platt and Majdik).
In this spirit, argumentation scholar David Frank juxtaposed classical and Jewish
understandings of reasoning to illustrate what insights Talmudic and similar
traditions can offer the theory and practice of argument. Frank writes that:
The Jewish tradition offers much to the broader study of argumentation. Indeed,
the process of argumentation is often more important than Truth. Ultimately, the
Jewish tradition of argument teaches the global community of the benefits of
reasoned discourse and pluralism…. In this tradition, God argues with humans.
In turn, humans argue with each other, authority resides in the strength of reasons
that acknowledge experience and the Other, and disagreement and contrarian
thinking are prized. (85)
Rather than remaining passive recipients of deterministic messages from above, many
Jewish works position human beings as active agents in petitioning God and one another
to take certain courses of action. Frank points out that ‘‘by arguing, rather than simply
exercising raw power, God relinquishes control over and vests freedom to humans’’ (74),
underscoring how argumentation can release agency within this faith tradition.1
We add to this line of scholarship the idea that Jewish theological texts and a range
of related literatures exhibit connections between argumentation and playful humor,
1 Although there are not many studies of argumentation in Judaic religious texts, Jacobs also focused on
the use of the kal va-chomer (a fortiori argument, i.e., ‘‘all the more so’’) and its use in the Hebrew Bible.
The kal va-chomer is one of the thirteen principles of logic used in rabbinic exegesis and in Jewish law.
According to the Midrash (Genesis Rabbah 92:7), this type of logical argumentation is used ten times in
the Hebrew Bible.
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with implications for the theory and practice of argument in and potentially outside the
tradition. In essence, in Jewish theological and similar literature, an argumentative
orientation has provided grounds for humor with and about the Almighty, which in
turn constructs space for further argument and agency both between humans and God
and with humans and one another. This focus connects to Palczewski’s call for
scholars to examine the significance of ‘‘play’’ as an expansive metaphor for
argumentation, since ‘‘argument is fun and arguers can be playful’’ (16; see also Asen,
‘‘A Discourse’’), even when debating serious matters. Palczewski’s recommendation
for the productiveness of the ‘‘play’’ frame—rather than the rampant ‘‘war’’ metaphors
found in public discourse about argument—bears a resemblance to cases other
scholars have made about humor. Both philosophically and empirically, humor and
play tend to foster more open and flexible outlooks than the narrowness and fixity of
tragic perspectives (Bergson; Morreall; McGhee), with Burke even suggesting that a
‘‘comic frame’’ is one of the broadest and most valuable orientations for human
thought and action. Madsen too finds that this frame counteracts the ‘‘‘bureaucratic’
mindset that can eliminate the bases for constructive argument’’ (164).
More specifically, we find in Jewish literature that humor’s capacity to bisociate
between different domains of human experience can share a symbiotic relationship
with argumentation’s emphasis on producing multiple, contested perspectives. Arthur
Koestler once drew attention to humor’s ability to bring together ‘‘two mutually
incompatible codes, or associative contexts,’’ with ‘‘the perceiving of a situation or
idea … in two self-consistent but habitually incompatible frames of reference’’ (35;
see also Waisanen, ‘‘A Citizens’’ 130–134). The term bisociation distinguishes
between the skills of reasoning in singular ways and the more creative act of ‘‘always
opera[ting] on more than one plane’’ (35). Humor is often produced by linking together
what could equally be called differing ‘‘‘types of logic,’ ‘codes of behavior,’
‘universes of discourse,’’’ or variable ‘‘matrices of thought’’ within which less flexible
codes of rules and forms of reasoning tend to be nested (38, 40). Between these frames
of reference one can find ‘‘link[s]’’ or a ‘‘focal concept, word, or situation which is
bisociated with both mental planes’’ (64). Mel Brooks’s movies, for example, often
bisociate the logics of Nazism against alternate contexts like Broadway musicals (as in
The Producers). As a link between the two different domains, seeing typically austere
soldiers in military garb prancing around a stage with fluid, silly movements targets the
very resistance to bisociative thinking in totalizing, fascist discourses.
Similarly, the study and practice of argumentation has long focused on making
more than one perspective available for communication and critique between
interlocutors. In particular, the ancient concept of dissoi logoi or ‘‘the practice of
airing multiple sides of vexing questions for the purpose of stimulating critical
thinking’’ (Mitchell 95) has been foundational to argumentation. Originally defined
by the sophist Protagoras, who taught that ‘‘two accounts are present about every
‘thing’’’ (Schiappa, Protagoras 100; Kerferd 84; Crick 343), dissoi logoi—like
humor—encourages the same skill of producing other viewpoints. Argument
scholars have described some of the instances, functions, and phases of humor
during U.S. election debates (Smith and Voth; Peifer and Holbert; Rhea). In this
analysis, we move to a different context, Jewish literature, to show how traditions of
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arguing and using humor with God construct norms for argumentation as the playful
promotion of differing perspectives.2
Given the planetary stakes for ideas about the human and divine, it is especially
important to draw out productive ideas about argumentation and humor within and
between religious traditions, where adherence to doctrine can so easily turn to
dogma. Differences in ideology between groups or countries, whether based on
politics, economics, or religion, can often lead to war (Barash and Webel 192). In
one sense, the grounds for unnecessary conflict often stem from ideologues who
tend to be certain that only their particular beliefs are correct, with little toleration
for dissent or further learning. In this study, we will show how strands of Jewish
theology and related literatures can rebut such approaches. To be clear, while our
case should certainly speak to those within Jewish and similar traditions, we hope to
show that the norms of humor and argument constructed from this tradition also
have some broader relevance to secular discourse theory and those for whom the
religion is not an authority. At a minimum, such readers will be better prepared to
advocate that religionists influenced by these traditions see argumentation and
tolerance as more central to their beliefs than they may be admitting.
Although the thought of arguing or disagreeing with an omniscient God might seem
strange, a number of biblical characters do just that. Contrary to fundamentalist
claims,3 within limits the God of the Hebrew Bible is omniscient but enjoys a good
argument, broadening the possibilities for human agency and reasoning and
reasonability. More so, an understanding of argumentation with the divine has had a
related, profound effect on Judaic humor, raising questions like: Does God have a
sense of humor? Can he be joked about or with? And if God is omniscient, why does he
ever lose an argument or change his mind?4 Overall, once mortals realize that—at least
in the Jewish tradition—God can accept many perspectives through humor, teasing,
arguing, disputes, criticism, and in at least one case, even lawsuits, a critical point
emerges: citizens should learn to live and reason with others with whom they disagree.
Toward this end, in the following sections we analyze how argumentation with
God has been emphasized throughout many Jewish theological literatures, as a
foundation for playful, humorous orientations between mortals and the Almighty.
These texts include the Hebrew Bible, the Talmud, the Midrash, and Chassidic tales
and other Jewish literature. This essay then considers how humor and argument in
these texts have influenced modern Jewish joking with and about God, promoting
agency and collaboration while countering fundamentalist and antideliberative
perspectives. We conclude with several implications highlighting the possibilities
2 While not considering the specific mechanisms by which humor and argument can interact, philosopher
Ted Cohen also speculates that Jewish historical emphases upon critical reasoning and logic likely share a
relationship with Jewish jokes (65). Cohen states that: ‘‘A person in this tradition does not only learn and
memorize the conclusions reached, although he [sic] must do some of that. Rather, he joins this study: he
argues, debates, contests, criticizes, and learns; and he does not stop’’ (66)—a point aligning with our
analysis.
3 We follow Berger’s (The Heretical) definition of ‘‘fundamentalism.’’ In a world in which ‘‘choice’’
among many available options is a defining feature of faith communities, Berger outlines three modern
approaches to religion, one of which is ‘‘deductive’’ fundamentalist approaches that simply affirm
inviolable traditions or tenets in ways that are impervious to incoming information or further reasoning.
4 An unpublished working paper upon which this essay is based can be found at Friedman and Friedman.
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for reasoning and reasonability both in and outside the Jewish faith tradition. We
also recognize some potential limitations of and qualifications for this analysis,
given more malevolent portrayals of God and humor’s darker side as a form of
communication.
1 Playful Argumentation with the Omniscient
Much research in the areas of Judaic and Religious Studies focuses on topics dealing
with how God is portrayed in the Bible and Rabbinic literature, and such a review
would require an article by itself. Scholars have noted that Rabbinic literature is
replete with anthropomorphism, especially in its parables (Stern, Parables 97–101),
positioning the Omniscient as a relatable entity. The Pentateuch uses numerous
anthropomorphisms to describe God, so it is not surprising that rabbinic literature
follows suit (Stern, Midrash 73–84). Other scholars have noted how irony, both
humorous and tragic, is used a great deal in the Hebrew Bible (Good). Whedbee
declares that ‘‘the Holy Book we call the Bible revels in a profoundly ambivalent
laughter, a divine and human laughter that by turns is both mocking and joyous,
subversive and celebrative, and finally a laughter that results in an exuberant and
transformative comic vision’’ (4). Similar to the position we undertake in this
analysis, Carolyn Sharp too notes how the Hebrew Bible often refuses ‘‘the
limitations of bibliolatry and literalism…. monologic speech and monologic
interpretation’’ (241).
Scholars have seen humor and comic elements in the Hebrew Bible as ‘‘a
valuable strategy for biblical exegesis’’ (Brenner and Radday 13), enumerating in
detail the different types of humor in the book (Friedman). Spaulding notes that ‘‘the
Torah abounds in every form of witticism, humor, riddle and practical joke’’ (xiv).
While the Hebrew Bible mentions the term ‘‘laughter’’ 50 times, many historical
Jewish figures, movements, and traditions have also been instrumental in promoting
humor, from witty Hasidic sages and Yiddish theaters to the acceptance of joking
during Purim (Avner 591–592). Relative to argumentation studies, less considered
has been the relationship between God as arguer and humor, which might challenge
the reification of human symbols and sponsor dialogue, reciprocity, and tolerance.
Before exploring how argument and humor interact more explicitly in Jewish
theology, and, as this may be a new or strange idea for some readers, it is worth
spotlighting examples in the Hebrew Bible where mortals argue or disagree with an
omnipotent and omniscient God. Surprisingly, God does not do very well in these
disputes, which, in itself, can be considered quite humorous. How does one even
begin to have the temerity to disagree with an omniscient God? Since God knows
exactly what individuals are going to say, why would He be swayed by an
argument? Yet it is exactly the tensions raised by such questions—particularly the
incongruities generated between mortal and immortal reasoning—that provide
humans with humorous grounds for further argument and agency. Funnily enough,
in many of the examples, the mortal even wins.
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1.1 The Hebrew Bible
In the Hebrew Bible, God appears to enjoy negotiating with mortals. Perhaps the
most famous example is that of Abraham ‘‘haggling’’ with God to save Sodom and
Gomorra from destruction:
Abraham: What if there are 50 innocent people in the city? Will you still destroy
it?
God: If I find 50 innocent people in Sodom, I will spare the entire area.
Abraham: Suppose there are 45… ?
God: I will not destroy it if I find 45…
Abraham: What if there are 40?
God: I will not act if there are 40. (Genesis 18:23–33)5
As this conversation continues, Abraham proposes and God agrees to allow for 30,
20, and then ten in succession, until Abraham finally gives up, presumably because
even ten innocents could not be found in the two towns. Abraham, while arguing
with God, even has the temerity to blurt: ‘‘Shall the Judge of the whole world not act
justly’’ (Genesis 18:25)? At least in this example, the God of the Hebrew Bible may
be omniscient but accepts and even welcomes criticism.
Beyond negotiation, God often exhibits patience and an ability to work with
refutations when attempting to persuade human beings. When God asks Moses to
deliver the Israelites from the hands of the Egyptian oppressors, Moses declines five
times using five different arguments ranging from ‘‘who am I that I should go to
Pharaoh’’ to ‘‘but they will not believe me’’ to ‘‘I am not a man of words’’ (Exodus
3:11–4:10). God refutes each one of Moses’ arguments, performing miracles along
the way to add some rhetorical flourish to the persuasive task. Moses arouses God’s
wrath when he finally tells him to send anyone but himself (Exodus 4:13), showing
that the prophet-to-be’s previous arguments had merely been excuses. More so,
Moses’ failure was one of deliberation—he had not really brought his best
argumentative abilities to the encounter.
The God and Moses debate continues at critical junctures throughout the Hebrew
Bible, with further argument and agency proceeding from the prior encounters.
After the Israelites created a golden calf, God tells Moses to ‘‘leave me alone so my
fierce wrath can blaze against them, and I will destroy them’’ (Exodus 32:10). At
this point, Moses has not yet said anything, but understood from these words that
God appeared to be encouraging him to defend his people. Moses uses an argument
that if God eradicates the Israelites, the Egyptians will mock the Almighty and say
that He took them out of Egypt with an evil intent to slay them in the mountains
(Exodus 32:12), effectively holding the omniscient accountable to his own
omniscient standards. Moses makes the point that if God were to wipe out the
Israelites, the Egyptians would mock Him and say that either He was too weak or
too capricious to save the Jewish people. Eventually, the Lord gave in and ‘‘repented
of the evil which he thought to do to his people’’ (Exodus 32:14). In this situation,
5 Please note that translations of the Hebrew Bible and other religious texts in this analysis are the
authors’ own.
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even the omniscient One can change his mind, humbling himself enough to open
space for others’ arguments and perspectives.
Contrary to what might be expected, when humans come ready to argue
before the God of the Hebrew Bible, it is not from a passive, subservient
position. Biblical figures are as vigorous with the Almighty as they might be
with a judge in a court of law, adding force to their claims to bring what
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca call ‘‘presence’’ to the argumentation—and
making available a ‘‘rowdiness’’ some believe are critical for public deliberation
(Ivie). The biblical figure of Job, for example, demands to confront God and
know the reason for all his suffering. He angrily rails against the injustice that
he perceives, declaring that God ‘‘destroys the innocent and the wicked’’ (Job
9:22). His wish is granted and God answers him with a noteworthy sarcasm:
‘‘Where were you when I laid the foundations of the earth? … Have you ever in
your life commanded the morning, or told the dawn its place’’ (Job 38:4, 12)?
Job’s response to the cosmic imbalance between his mortal position and the
course of action to which his maker has committed is an eloquent appeal against
the incongruity: ‘‘Though He [God] slay me; I will have hope in Him; Yet I will
argue my case before Him’’ (Job 13:15). Cohen thinks that the absurdities at the
heart of many biblical stories like Job’s formed the basis for much Jewish humor
(45–68), a world ‘‘endlessly incomprehensible, always baffling, a world that is
beyond us and yet our world’’ (60). Yet we would add that, where a classically
tragic response might have seen Job narrowing his outlook and giving into the
unfolding fate, his statement is comically oriented in both bisociating between
congruous and incongruous planes and in the refusal to resign himself without
further argumentation with the deity.
These are just some examples of mortals who have no problem disagreeing
with God. They may have learned this from Adam who, after eating from the
forbidden fruit of the Tree of Knowledge, tries to justify his behavior by blaming
it on God—a lame argument, but an argument nonetheless. Adam tells God, ‘‘The
woman whom You gave to be with me, she gave me from the tree, and I ate’’
(Genesis 3:12). Adam becomes a comic character in the argument, both by having
the nerve to blame God and by passing the responsibility for his actions onto his
wife. Other biblical figures like Cain are not much better. After Cain kills his
brother Abel, God asks him a rhetorical question ‘‘‘Where is Abel your brother?’;
and [Cain] said, ‘I do not know. Am I my brother’s keeper’’’ (Genesis 4:9)?
Rather than striking Cain dead with a lightning bolt, God dialogues with him in an
ironic inquiry, inviting the mortal’s justifications for the murder. God’s sense of
irony is further manifest in his discussion with Abraham about naming his soon-
to-be-born son ‘‘Isaac’’ (the Hebrew name Yitzchak [Isaac in English] means ‘‘he
laughed’’). Abraham laughed when he heard that he, a one-hundred-year-old man,
and Sarah, his 90-year-old wife, would have a child (Genesis 17:19). At least in
these situations, that God could not only take the laughter but nominalized
Abraham’s reaction speaks to the deity’s acceptance of the ‘‘process’’ of dialogic
encounters, even if He may disagree with the argumentative ‘‘products’’ humans
provide during such moments (see O’Keefe).
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1.2 The Talmud
The Talmud is the compilation of Jewish oral law and consists of the mishna and the
gemara. The mishna was compiled and redacted by Rebbi (Rabbi Yehuda the Nasi
who was president of the Sanhedrin) about the year 189 C.E. The gemara consists
mainly of commentaries and discussions of the mishna and was put into written
form about 1,500 years ago. The Midrash, which is essentially devoted to the
exposition of Biblical verses, is of two types: the Halachic Midrash, which is
mainly concerned with Jewish law, and the Aggadic Midrash, which is homiletic
and mainly concerned with morality. Several scholars note that many of the
homiletic portions of the Talmud and Midrash were not meant to be taken literally,
but were intended to inspire or to provide hints about the world’s mysteries (Chajes
195; Maimonides, Chap. 10). In particular, in the Talmud people mostly argue with
one another to understand God’s laws. The Talmud and Midrash have had a strong
influence on the Jewish people, and are filled with stories and different types of
humor, including humor involving God. As we find, these emphases upon argument
and humor as ways to create understanding encourage the proliferation of
perspectives through dissoi logoi and bisociation.
In one Talmudic story, God asks for a blessing from Rabbi Yishmael b. Elisha, a
High Priest. The story not only depicts God asking a mere mortal for a blessing—
lowering his status to accommodate human communication—but highlights how the
rabbi comically turns the tables on God, simultaneously requesting a blessing that
will benefit the Jewish people:
Rabbi Yishmael b. Elisha said: I once entered the innermost part of the
Temple to offer incense and I saw that God, the Lord of Hosts, was seated on a
high and lofty throne. He said to me: Yishmael, My son, bless me. I said to
Him: May it be Your will that Your compassion should suppress Your anger
and that Your compassion prevail over all Your other attributes so that You
should treat Your children with the attribute of mercy and You should stop
short of the strict letter of the law for them. And God nodded to me with His
head. (Babylonian Talmud, Berachot 7a)
Contrary to an image of the deity only barking orders at humankind, passages like
these demonstrate the God of the Hebrew Bible’s flexibility, both in terms of his
ability to violate expectations (i.e. the rabbi blessing God) and remain open to
human arguments and the possibility of changing his mind.
Indeed, humor often arises in these texts when human beings fail to reciprocate
and engage in a dialogic encounter with the divine. As this next passage from the
Talmud shows, God can be satirical and expects to be greeted just as any mortal
would. God was insulted when Moses, who went up to heaven for 40 days, ignored
and did not wish Him well on His handiwork:
Rabbi Yehoshua b. Levi said: At the time that Moses ascended to Heaven, he
found the Holy One tying crowns on the letters of the Torah. God said to him:
Moses, in your town people do not give greetings? Moses replied: Is it then
proper for a servant to extend greetings to his master? God said to him: You
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should have wished me success. Moses then said to Him (Numbers 14:17):
‘‘And now let the power of the Lord be great, as You once declared.’’
(Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 89a)
Moses’ response was close to a traditional Jewish way of congratulating someone
on a job well done by blessing her or him with the strength to continue. Before
Moses’ concession at the end of the passage, his dilemma of what to wish God can
also been seen as humorous (and reminiscent of an old joke, ‘‘What do you say
when God sneezes? You bless You?’’), and typical of the master-servant dynamic at
the center of much comic dialogue (see Johnstone). The surprise of God’s desire to
both communicate and metacommunicate with his subjects about standards for
engagement grounds interactivity as equally if not more important than hierarchy.
While hierarchy may certainly exist between mortals and the immortal figure, it
is a hierarchy where argument and humor can upset the balance of power so that
unending and expansive relational dialogue frequently becomes more significant
than particular outcomes in human-divine communication. The story of Choni
HaMagil (the Circle Maker) demonstrates that Choni’s relationship with the Creator
was very much like that of a son to a father. The relationship exhibits Choni’s
impatience with his Creator’s processes, with God playfully toying with each of
Choni’s requests. During a time when rainfall was desperately needed, Choni gave
God an ultimatum that he would not remove himself from a small circle in the dirt
until rain came. God first taunts Choni with a light drizzle, followed by an
overwhelming deluge (‘‘the sages estimated that no raindrop was less than one
lug’’), before finally delivering the kind of rain the people needed (Babylonian
Talmud, Taanit 23a).
Choni’s inflexible ultimatum to God can be seen as a commitment to operate on a
single plane of thought. God’s answers force Choni to bisociate his position with
other, unexpected frames that follow but prank the request to expand communi-
cative space—with ‘‘rain’’ acting as a link between these different planes. In the
story, God uses the humorous bisociation to underscore a need for more patience
and tolerance than Choni has admitted, with humor in some sense even setting the
grounds for a relationship in which good argumentation can take place. Telushkin
sees this story as proving that God is a ‘‘primordial joker’’ (146), but we would also
note how understating and overstating (both classic comic devices) the rain from
above sought a reaction from Choni. Like a stand-up comedian who misdirects
audience expectations at each turn in her or his act to create an involving discourse,
the God portrayed in these Talmudic texts plays to engage humanity.
In another Talmudic story involving the poverty-stricken Rabbi Elazar b. Pedath,
God admits that the world is sometimes unjust and that he would have to remake it
to change the sad plight of some unfortunates, and asks the rabbi: ‘‘would it please
you if I turned the world back to its very beginnings? Perhaps then you might be
born at a more auspicious time for achieving sustenance’’ (Babylonian Talmud,
Taanit 25a). In exchange for not having to turn back time, God tells Elazar that He
will make it up to him in the next world and describes the reward (‘‘I will provide
for you in the next world thirteen rivers of pure balsam oil, which you will be able to
enjoy’’), to which the rabbi laughs and exclaims ‘‘Only that and nothing more?’’ The
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argument continues, with God responding to the rabbi’s taunts with the rhetorical
question: ‘‘Then what will be left for Me to give to your colleagues?’’ Not letting his
Creator off the hook, the rabbi makes the case that more justice is demanded: ‘‘Am I
asking from someone who has nothing?,’’ to which God responds by flicking his
finger on the rabbi’s forehead (25a).
With the finger flicking at the end, the passage reads a bit like a Three Stooges
dialogue. But the spirit of the exchange should not be lost: God accepts humor and
argument as an important means of vertical communication between himself and his
creation, and by implication as a model for horizontal communication between
people. Different than the Choni story, where God uses bisociative frames to
encourage expanded argumentative space, here the rabbi would have God toggle
between a world in which His promises are satisfactory and another world in which
those same promises are seen as underwhelming or stingy. The example speaks to
how Talmudic texts encourage bisociative reasoning from both above and below,
enabling a ‘‘refusal to remain a creature of habit, governed by a single set of ‘rules
of the game’’’ (Koestler 63). Moreover, Rabbi Solomon Ben Isaac—usually referred
to as Rashi (1040–1105), a major commentator on the Bible and Talmud—
explained that the ‘‘flicking’’ action was an expression of love. God actually enjoyed
Rabbi Elazar’s retort so much that the action was an admission that He could
probably afford to give his servant a better reward. Spaulding further notes how
those ‘‘nearest and dearest to their hearts’’ are the targets of much Jewish humor,
which ‘‘radiates affection—a kiss with salt on the lips, but a kiss nevertheless’’
(xvi).
While the omniscient can take a playful approach to communication between
himself and his subjects, at other times his laughter also turns more serious.
Humankind’s arguments with the deity are still subject to judgments, as outlined by
a Talmudic passage where God underscores how he will act toward nations that
have forsaken his offers: ‘‘The Holy One will sit and laugh at them, as it is written
(Psalms 2:4): ‘He who sits in Heaven shall laugh’ (Babylonian Talmud, Avodah
Zarah 2b–3b).
Yet, like the Hebrew Bible, the Talmud often spotlights God’s openness to
suggestions from mortals, and his willingness to change His mind when ‘‘wrong,’’ a
state that ought to be impossible for a perfect deity.6 One story about Rabbah b.
Shila portrays God as someone who studies the law and even quotes mortals
(Babylonian Talmud, Chagigah 15b), despite being the one who gave the law to the
Israelites. Who ought to know better what the law entails, the giver or the receiver?
Who ought to know best what is in the heart of humans, God or Rabbah? Human
6 The Talmud also describes a situation in which God admitted that He made a ‘‘mistake.’’ In response to
Moses’ inquiry into God’s name, the text explains the meaning of God’s reply in Exodus as ‘‘I Will Be
What I Will Be’’ (Exodus 3:14). (Note: most translators translate this name as ‘‘I Am Who I Am,’’ even
although, grammatically, the words that make up the name are in the future tense—Ehyeh means ‘‘I will
be’’). God instructed Moses to tell the Israelites, ‘‘I shall be with them in this servitude just as I will be
with them in other servitudes.’’ Moses hence told God: ‘‘They have enough troubles now; you do not have
to tell them about future troubles.’’ God agreed with Moses’ argument and subsequently instructed him to
tell the Israelites (Exodus 3:14): ‘‘I Will Be has sent me’’ (Babylonian Talmud, Berachot 9b).
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reasoning plays a significant part in demonstrating that God’s omniscient acts
include tacit concessions and comic turns from singular points of view:
Rabbah b. Shila once encountered Elijah the Prophet [who reveals himself to
great people]. He asked him: What is the Holy One doing? Elijah answered:
He is quoting legal decisions in the names of all the Rabbis, but not in the
name of Rabbi Meir. Rabbah asked: Why? Elijah answered: Because Rabbi
Meir studied laws from the mouth of acher [literally, the other, a name given
to Rabbi Elisha b. Avuyah who became a heretic]. Rabbah explained: Rabbi
Meir found a pomegranate, he ate the fruit on the inside and discarded the
peel. Elijah answered: Now God is saying, ‘‘Meir, my son, says …’’
(Babylonian Talmud, Chagigah 15b)
When Rabbah explains that another rabbi only culled the good in learning from
Acher and discarded the bad, God accepts this reasoning and starts quoting Rabbi
Meir. In doing so, He remains attentive to the ways that ‘‘an advocate’s discourse
implicitly or explicitly widens or narrows discursive space for others’’ (Asen,
‘‘Ideology’’ 263). Not even God is beyond changing his mind, if people are willing
to prepare good reasons in support of their cases.
With some caveats, God is frequently portrayed by Talmudic texts as bringing a
playful orientation to bear on his love of argumentation. Rabbi Eliezer b. Hyrkanos,
who was of the Shammai school, refused to go along with the majority in a dispute
regarding the oven of Aknai, and whether it could become ritually unclean. To
prove his point, Rabbi Eliezer performed various miracles, which were all ignored.
Finally,
Rabbi Eliezer said: If the law is as I say, let it be proven from Heaven.
A Heavenly voice then rang out and exclaimed: What do you want with Rabbi
Eliezer, since the law is in agreement with him in all areas. Rabbi Yehoshua
then got up on his feet and declared: ‘‘It [the Torah] is not in Heaven’’
(Deuteronomy 30:12). What does ‘‘It is not in Heaven’’ mean? Rabbi
Yirmiyah said: Since the Torah was already given at Sinai, we therefore pay
no attention to Heavenly voices. After all, it is written in the Torah itself:
‘‘After the majority one must follow’’ (Exodus 23:2). Rabbi Nathan met Elijah
the Prophet and asked him: What was God doing at that time [when His
Heavenly voice was disregarded]? Elijah answered: He laughed and said: My
children have triumphed over me. My children have triumphed over me.
(Babylonian Talmud, Baba Metzia 59b; emphasis added)
In this passage, God laughs when He realizes that mortals refuse to accept Him as
the final authority on everything, since ‘‘The Torah is no longer in heaven.’’ The
story shows God as being interested in the law and ineffectively trying to influence
the outcome of a legal debate. We should note that there are further complications
and paradoxes to the rest of this story; it does not end particularly well for Rabbi
Eliezer, who is excommunicated, nor for his excommunicator, whom God strikes
dead (see Luban 1253–1288). The rabbis’ deductive allegiance to texts in the face of
incoming evidence—as well as God’s vacillating judgments and ways of
approaching humans’ decisions—could equally be called into question in this case.
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But we would also note that God is frequently portrayed throughout the Torah as a
‘‘judge’’ who listens to and decides on human arguments, and as passages like the
oven of Aknai partially recognize, playfully laughs at being bested by others’
arguments in a manner that belies a fundamentalist position at one of the story’s
most critical points.
That said, God often wins the argument, as another story about Rabbah b.
Nachmeni spotlights (Babylonian Talmud, Baba Metzia 86a). Remarkably, even in
these accounts God is described as needing the help of a mortal who was ‘‘unique in
his knowledge of the laws of leprosy’’ to make a convincing case (86a). When it
comes to a legal dispute, even one between God and the angels in heaven, a well-
trained expert can expand the grounds of argument to resolve the dispute,
illustrating the comic frame and broad circumference (Burke) with which the
Almighty can approach humans.7
1.3 The Midrash
As in other foundational Jewish religious texts, the Midrash portrays playful and
humorous argument with God as a good worth preserving. Even God’s precedents
are fair game for change if human beings can make a smart or entertaining case for
better values or principles. Different than what might be expected, much of this
literature characterizes God as interested in abductive and flexible, casuistic
reasoning rather than simply unchanging, universalizing deductions (on ‘‘casuistry,’’
see Jonsen and Toulmin). There is a Midrash that points out three places where
Moses disagreed with God and was told, ‘‘You have taught me’’ (Midrash Numbers
Rabbah 19:33). One example is in reference to the verse: ‘‘visiting the sin of the
fathers on the children to the third and the fourth generation of those who hate me’’
(Exodus 20:5). Moses retorts to God that many wicked people have righteous
children. For example, Abraham’s father, Terach, was an idol worshipper, yet
Abraham was virtuous, making God’s potential punishment for the parents’
iniquities inconsistent and unjust. God agrees and then states in the Torah ‘‘Fathers
shall not be put to death because of their children, nor shall children be put to death
because of their fathers. Each one shall be put to death for his own sin’’
(Deuteronomy 24:16). These books show that God does not mind being taught by
mortals, often maintaining a tolerant comic stance toward incoming information.
As opposed to a picture of God always chastising humans for challenges to his
power, these scriptures exemplify the use of humor to draw God’s attention to
human cases. According to the Midrash (and the aforementioned example from the
Hebrew Bible), Moses tried several good arguments on God to convince Him not to
punish the Jewish people. For example,
Moses said to God: Why are you angry with the Israelites? Is it not because
they made an idol [the golden calf]? You never told them not to do this. God
replied to Moses: Did I not say in the second commandment (Exodus 20:3),
‘‘Thou shalt have no other gods before me?’’ Moses replied: You did not
7 Maimonides, who wrote the encyclopedic compilation of Talmudic law, can also be found disagreeing
with God (Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Laws of Leprosy 2:9).
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command them, you commanded me, since You did not say, ‘‘You [plural]
shalt not have …’’ It was thus only me that You commanded. Hence, if I have
made an idol (Exodus 32:32), ‘‘Blot me, please, out of Your book.’’ (Midrash
Exodus Rabbah 47:9)
Moses to God: gotcha. The second commandment states: Lo yihyeh lecha not Lo
yihyeh lachem. Lachem (to you) is plural and lecha (to you) is singular. The
argument was the kind that an adroit defense lawyer might make when looking for a
loophole in a legal document, wittily holding the prosecutor to his own standards by
digging into a single word choice upon which the entire case could turn. Lecha acts
as a bisociative link between a frame in which God’s grand principles apply to a
nation and another in which their scope is more limited. Puncturing elevated
language and diminishing the grandiose are classic comic structures (Berger, The
Art 10, 41), which in this case also function to construct an argument circumscribing
the boundaries of God’s claim.
The quality of argumentation still remains a vital part of such encounters,
however. While a range of Judaic texts show God’s willingness to entertain playful
arguments with his creation, he still critically assesses the reasons and standards by
which they are conducted. One Midrash (Numbers Rabbah 20:6) notes that two
individuals—Cain and Balaam—did not respond correctly to God. They should
have known that an omniscient God was asking the question to begin a
conversation, hoping that they would show remorse (i.e. each question was
rhetorical and not supposed to be answered in the way the three individuals
responded). God asked Cain ‘‘Where is Abel your brother?’’ A correct response
might have been: ‘‘You are omniscient and know where he is.’’ Cain’s reply was ‘‘I
do not know. Am I my brother’s keeper’’ (Genesis 4:9)? God also asked Balaam
‘‘who are these men with you’’ (Numbers 22:9)? Claiming to be God’s prophet,
Balaam should have known that the Lord knew who the men were and what they
wanted, and thus that His question was rhetorical. Instead, Balaam answers the
question.
More than the other works, the Midrash is especially clear about how God
himself should engage in argumentation rather than coercion with humankind. He
largely attempts to persuade entire nations to join him in a communicative
relationship, but does not force these encounters on the unwilling. There is one
episode that portrays God trying to sell his ‘‘wares’’ to the countries of the world. He
goes to the descendants of Esau, who question what is in the Torah and refuse to
engage with God because they, well, really like murder. God receives similar
treatment from ‘‘the children of Ishmael,’’ for whom stealing is quite a lark, and the
‘‘children of Ammon and Moab,’’ who make it clear that adultery and incest are
high on their list of commitments. In the end, ‘‘there was no nation among the
nations that God did not go to, speak to, and knock at their door’’ (Sifre
Deuteronomy 33:2). The manner in which the Midrash depicts God as a kind of
door-to-door salesperson trying to peddle His Torah to each of the nations has a
humorous bent, bisociating between God as immortal ruler of the universe and God
as mortal marketer. Through such bisociations, humans can escape their ‘‘more or
less automatized routines of thinking and behaving,’’ linking ‘‘previously
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unconnected matrices of experience’’ (Koestler 45) to create understanding. This
Midrash is cited in many places across Jewish theological texts, showing that in the
end, and with some comic desperation, God only finds one customer for His Torah.
As with human relationships, if communication between the deity and His
creation were perfect, there would simply be no need for argumentation. Once Israel
and God establish a covenant with one another, the Midrash warrants argumentation
precisely because of the imperfections of mortal-immortal discourse, which further
fuels the humor in these events. The next Midrash shows how the Jewish people
later used their unique status relative to other nations to justify praying to God after
the Temple’s destruction:
The Holy One said to Israel: You are acting impudently [by praying to me
after I have driven you out of Israel]. They replied: Creator of the Universe, it
is appropriate and proper that we do so, for no other nation accepted your
Torah except for us. God replied: I was the One who disqualified all the
nations for your sake. The Jewish people said to God: If so, why did you take
Your Torah around to every nation and they did not accept it? (Midrash
Lamentations Rabbah 3:1)
In a sense, the passage reads like a married couple having an argument as to who
had been pursuing whom in the marriage. Like a human partnership, the texts
entertain the possibility that the relationship between the nation and God also
requires continual attention, with back-and-forth arguments playing an important
part in keeping the relationship going. This analogy is brought home in the
Midrash’s parable of a king who throws out his queen and, then, seeing her later
clinging to the pillar of the palace, says to her: ‘‘You are acting impudently’’
(Midrash Lamentations Rabbah 3:1). The queen replies that she is ‘‘acting
appropriately since no other woman would accept you except for me.’’ The dialogue
continues with the king pleading that ‘‘I was the one who disqualified all women for
you,’’ to which the queen finally replies, ‘‘If so, why did you enter that street, that
yard, and that place? Were you not rejected by all the women there’’ (3:1)? The
queen points to how the king’s short-sighted, narrow data humorously bypasses
some important empirical evidence justifying her actions. In a theme we see across
many of these texts, advocates bring together argument and humor to maintain that
broader perspectives are necessary to the case at hand.
The very closeness of the relationship between Israel and God allows for
argumentation to flow easily. Due to this intimacy, we also find examples in the
Midrash of humans holding God accountable for the quality of his own arguments
with humankind. God sometimes blames in a way that—at least by human
standards—could be thought unfair. According to the Midrash, Moses does not let
Him get away with it, as in a passage where God tells Moses that the people who he
led out of Egypt had been corrupted. Moses questions the Lord on this point, first
with a rhetorical question, and then with a claim and evidence from the Torah
countering the assertion: ‘‘when they are sinners, they are mine, and when they are
righteous, they are Yours? Whether they are sinners or righteous they are Yours,
since it is written (Deuteronomy 9:29): ‘They are Your people and Your heritage’’’
(Pesikta D’Rav Kahana, Pesikta 16). In this Midrash, God engages in the fallacious
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reasoning of a parent, who, when disappointed in the actions of a child, tells his
spouse, ‘‘Look what your child has done’’ (see also Friedman 280). Moses asks God
to return to a universe of discourse where His very forms of reasoning are more
internally consistent than the one He sets forth in his initial charges. Like many
Talmudic tales, human beings argue, negotiate, and even playfully best God.
1.4 Chassidic Tales and Other Jewish Literature
Treating God in an informal and familiar manner is common in Chassidic tales,
which have certainly been influenced by Talmudic stories. In Chassidic narratives,
God is often chided, albeit in a warm and satirical manner, for the harshness of the
Diaspora and for not helping His people. Indeed, since the Jewish people have
known a great deal of dispersion and diaspora (Spaulding xiv), the itinerant
experience of having to live in two or more cultures has likely encouraged a
bisociative lens in which argumentation and doubled-perspectives have become a
norm. Under diasporic conditions, the crossings of one language into another often
produces humor (Avner 599), which bears a resemblance to Koestler’s point that
‘‘the confrontation with an alien matrix reveals in a sharp, pitiless light what we
failed to see in following our dim routines’’ (73), corresponding with an ability to
produce dissoi logoi or the ‘‘two accounts … present about every ‘thing’’’
(Schiappa, Protagoras 100).
In one classic story, three Chassidic rabbis—Rabbi Elimelech of Lizhensk, Rabbi
Israel of Koznitz, and the Seer of Lublin—acted as the Jewish court in a suit brought
by an individual against God. Their verdict was that the plaintiff was right and God
was wrong for allowing the emperor to issue an edict against the Jews. God had no
choice but to obey the final verdict of the court, annulling the decree (Buber 258).
As a bearer of abstract standards like mercy and judgment,8 which often conflict in
actual human situations, God subjects himself to the same contingent environment
humans face in their decision-making. Argumentation becomes important in these
encounters to keep decisions from being radically relativistic, with the claims,
evidence, and warrants upon which principles might be followed continually made
available for argumentative processes.
A satirical quality permeates these texts, with God as the target of critiques. The
famous Rabbi Levi Yitzchak of Berditchev, known as the Berditchever, once
declared to God that if He did not forgive the Jewish people their sins, he would tell
the whole world that God’s phylacteries were invalid. According to the Talmud
(Babylonian Talmud, Berachot 6a), God’s phylacteries contain the verse ‘‘who is
like Your people Israel, a unique nation on earth’’ (I Chronicles 17:21). Rabbi Levi
Yitzchak exclaimed that if God did not forgive Israel its sins then it could not
possibly be a ‘‘unique nation on earth,’’ putting his very phylacteries into question.
Raising the stakes, on another occasion the rabbi scolded God and said: ‘‘The Jewish
people are your phylacteries. When one of the phylacteries of a simple Jew falls on
the ground he picks it up carefully and kisses it. Dear Lord! Your phylacteries have
fallen to the ground’’ (Buber 222).
8 For an extended treatment of this topic, see Kidder.
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As Dreyfus explains, arguments from consequences aim ‘‘not to establish a point
but merely to draw the consequences of previous statements and bring out the
contradictions or absurdities entailed by these statements’’ (47). Rabbi Levi
Yitzchak combines the exasperation and amusement of a raconteur with an
argument from consequences model that asks God to follow the implications of his
principles and premises. The rabbi bisociates a context in which phylacteries could
be seen as disembodied rules against a separate context underscoring that rules
mean little if not embodied in one form or another. In one story the Berditchever
even chides a tailor for not making a more forceful and reciprocal argument when
telling God: ‘‘You, O Lord, have committed grievous sins: You have taken away
babies from their mothers, and mothers from their babies. Let us be quits: may You
forgive me, and I will forgive You.’’ The Rabbi humorously indicts the tailor for
understating the argument: ‘‘Why did you let God off so easily? You might have
forced Him to redeem all of Israel’’ (Laytner 184).
In other Jewish literature, God is also portrayed in a disputational but playful
and amicable manner. For example, Sholom Aleichem’s unforgettable character,
Tevye the dairyman (best known from the play Fiddler on the Roof), had Job-like
conversations with God: ‘‘O God, All-powerful and All-Merciful, great and good,
kind and just, how does it happen that to some people you give everything and to
others nothing’’ (Aleichem 57)? In the middle of his prayer, Tevye would interject
his own personal, humorous comments toward the Creator: ‘‘Thou sustainest the
living with loving kindness—and, sometimes, with a little food’’ (50). He could
even be sarcastic at times: ‘‘With God’s help, I starved to death … three times a
day, not counting supper’’ (48). Tevye may have learned to criticize God from
Abraham who often had the temerity to disapprove of God’s judgments by asking
questions such as, ‘‘Shall the Judge of the whole world not act justly’’ (Genesis
18:25)?
While playful argumentation can be seen throughout Jewish texts, a desire to
debate with God can also be seen as borne out of pain and horror. A desire to
critique and argue with God’s decisions and world is extensive throughout
Jewish literature, especially in modern works dealing with some of the worst
atrocities committed against the Jewish people. As an example, Elie Weisel’s
play Trial of God, set in 1649, tells the story of three nomadic actors who arrive
in a Ukranian village and find that almost all the Jewish inhabitants were killed
in a pogrom. They conduct a mock trial of God for permitting such awful things
to happen. Weisel based the play on a trial that he saw in Auschwitz as a boy,
where three rabbis tried God for allowing His children to be butchered by the
Nazis. From the viewpoint of our analysis, the problem of evil becomes less a
philosophical problem than a bisociative disjunct between a noumenal context in
which God’s words and promises have form and the empirical, anthropological
realities and disorienting logics his subjects have faced (see O’Leary). Under
these types of circumstances, authors of Jewish literature have petitioned the
transcendent being for more reasoning and reasonability than Jews have often
been provided.
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2 Joking with God
Arguing with God, criticizing God, and even suing God—with this rich tradition to
draw on, is it any wonder that many Jews continue to treat God, omnipotent and
omniscient though He is, as a member of the family subject to humor and teasing?
The importance of argumentation with the Almighty provides an important
foundation for also joking with and about God, which flies in the face of deductive
fundamentalist approaches to the kind of communication possible between mortals
and the divine figure.
As Lipset and Raab argue, ‘‘the application of any ‘fundamental’—that is,
revealed—truth to the political scene, being undebatable, makes impossible the
open market place of ideas and powers’’ (12). Humor’s capacity to expand
communicative frames broadens the potential for argumentation to move beyond the
solidified and monolithic tendencies of fundamentalism. Since one function of
humor is to minimize the distance between the sacred and the profane (Hyers 220),
humor in which God plays a role can make the Almighty seem closer to humankind,
making the search for truth an ‘‘intersubjective’’ (see Goodwin) matter across
Jewish traditions.
Many modern Jewish figures jest with the Almighty. The comedy of Woody
Allen has always had an argumentative bent. He often combines humor with pointed
critiques toward God in his jokes, as in his reference to ‘‘the sacred Jewish holiday
commemorating God’s reneging on every promise’’ (Novak and Waldoks 201).
Like Wiesel’s far more serious example, Allen bisociates between noumenal and
phenomenal contexts in this joke. Yet Allen’s famously self-deprecating humor also
demonstrates an important characteristic of both humor and argument, namely,
reflexivity. To be able to make fun of oneself underscores a possibility that alternate
frames of reference should always be available beyond fixed identities (see
Waisanen, ‘‘Toward’’). To argue well also requires a reflexive orientation to
continually examine and re-examine one’s own and others arguments.
Indeed, Novak and Waldoks note how ‘‘Jewish humor mocks everyone—
including God’’ (xxi). While ‘‘mock’’ may be too strong a word, Jewish humor
involving God often has a biting edge. Telushkin writes that Jewish jokes aimed at
God are ‘‘ironic digs, rather than belly laughs,’’ citing the following exemplar:
A man brings some very fine material to a tailor and asks him to make a pair of
pants. When he comes back a week later, the pants are not ready. Two weeks
later they are still not ready. Finally after six weeks the pants are ready. The
man tries them on. They fit perfectly. Nonetheless, when it comes time to pay,
he can’t resist a jibe at the tailor. ‘‘You know,’’ he says, ‘‘it took God only six
days to make the world. And it took you six weeks to make just one pair of
pants.’’ ‘‘Ah,’’ the tailor says. ‘‘But look at this pair of pants, and look at the
world!’’ (143–144)
Bisociating God’s creation against clothing repair through the pants/world link
fashions an argument in which the tailor’s practices can be seen as potentially less
enigmatic than the Almighty’s.
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In a similar spirit, there is a famous cartoon by Edward Sorel titled ‘‘Exodus
Unexpurgated.’’ In it the Israelites cross the Red Sea, but instead of being
overwhelmed by one of the greatest miracles of all time—the splitting of the sea—
the Jewish people kvetch. Every individual has another complaint: ‘‘My feet are
killing me’’; ‘‘From this smell you could plotz’’: ‘‘My back is killing me’’; ‘‘You call
this parting the sea? Look! The water is up to my ankles’’; ‘‘I told you not to shlep
all that stuff’’; and ‘‘If he’s so smart, why doesn’t he make these dead fish
disappear’’ (Sorel)? Such cartoons are not seen as blasphemous; rather, since God is
part of the family, he has to expect to be kidded. In their classic book of Jewish
humor, Novak and Waldoks also include a number of cartoons supposedly depicting
what happened on Mount Sinai when God gave the Torah to the Jewish people. In
one, Moses is cutting the tablets in half so that he only brings ten of the 20
commandments to the people. The most absurd one has Moses with a duck on his
head holding the tablets. God states: ‘‘I was talking to the duck!!! Ha Ha Ha Ha …’’
(213).
In examples like these, Jewish humor involving God makes a point about the
unfairness of life, the imperfections of the world, or the unjustness of the Diaspora.
Since God is the One to blame for the plight of His people, He is fair game for
humor—after all, He is omnipotent and omniscient. Each of the jokes toggle
between two realities, one serious and one playful, demonstrating that humans
should not have unswerving viewpoints when it comes to divine matters.
Jewish jokes are full of taunts from the top-down too, representing God as
actively producing humor and giving as good as He gets, as in the following joke:
A rabbi loves golfing so much that on Yom Kippur, he leaves his house very
early in the morning before services to play a quick nine holes. An angel looks
down from heaven and sees what is happening and is appalled by what the
rabbi is doing. He tells God. The rabbi strikes the ball and hits a hole in one.
The same thing happens at the second hole, the third hole, and all nine holes.
The rabbi keeps hitting holes in one; nine holes in one, a feat never
accomplished by anyone in the history of golf. The angel is horrified.
‘‘Almighty Lord,’’ he said, ‘‘you call this a punishment?’’ God answers:
‘‘Absolutely! Who can he tell?’’ (Novak and Waldoks 127)
From a God’s-eye perspective, it must be quite funny looking down upon all the
incongruities manifest in human communication. It must have been quite humorous,
for instance, seeing that the prophet Jonah would have known that God was
omniscient and omnipresent, yet felt that he could escape the Almighty by fleeing to
Tarshish (Jonah 1–3).
Some jokes about God do not have to be Jewish and, in fact, have appeared in
both Jewish and Christian collections of humor. Despite major and minor
disagreements among the faiths, common themes such as suffering, human
fallibility, and asking God ‘‘why’’ all arise through jokes. One example involves
Jacob, a religious man who refuses the help of rescue boats and helicopters during a
flood, stating that ‘‘God will take care of me.’’ Eventually he drowns, is taken up to
heaven, and demands to know why the Lord did not save him, to which God states:
‘‘Well, I sent you two boats and a helicopter. What else did you want me to do’’
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(Mallow 65)? As Heller notes, humor can prevent human beings from over-
identifying with particular creeds or beliefs (202). Similarly, while Jacob clung to a
discursive universe in which the divine figure was expected to abide by human
rules, God’s response uses the two boats and helicopter as a link to another frame
urging that the same situation be perceived in another way—an argument that Jacob
use interpretive humility in seeing that God’s reasoning may come in different
forms.
Other jokes manifest the humorous tensions that characterize any relationship, as
in the mountain climber who grabs a branch during an avalanche and is told to let go
of it by God. The mortal looks upward and asks, ‘‘Is there someone else up there I
could talk to’’ (Mallow 66)? Overall, there is a wealth of humor today in which God
plays a part, particularly on the Internet, where YouTube and other new media sites
exhibit the production and distribution of highly spreadable content across the globe
(see Jenkins, Ford, and Green).
3 Conclusion
God is frequently portrayed in both the Hebrew Bible as well as Rabbinic literature
as One who can be argued with. He even changes his mind. He is omnipotent but
still wants to be blessed; He is omniscient but laughs when bested by His children.
He is all-seeing and yet is told by the Psalmist: ‘‘Wake up! Rise to my defense’’
(Psalms 35:23)! This warm attitude and engagement vis-à-vis God has had a
profound effect on Jewish humor and literature, even to this day, making playful
argumentation using bisociation and dissoi logoi a prominent feature of Jewish
theological and other literatures. The Talmud is filled with legalistic arguments in
which no person is seen as infallible, and even has passages criticizing Abraham,
Moses, Elijah, and other great Biblical figures. Playful argumentation creates the
possibility of joking with God and toying with the contours of religious devotion.
According to a well-known joke, even Jews on desert islands have to build two
synagogues: the one they pray in and the one they never attend.
One implication from this analysis is that people and groups following Hebraic
traditions ought to take seriously and playfully God’s desire for dialogue and
reciprocity. Jewish theological and similar texts resound with examples demon-
strating that interactivity is as important as hierarchy. At many junctures, we find
the God of Judaic traditions listening to people, but also making arguments with
them in the hope of establishing a relationship where further communication can
take place—similar to Pearce and Pearce’s concept of ‘‘dialogic virtuosity,’’ an
approach ‘‘that enable[s] people to speak so that others can and will listen, and to
listen so that others can and will speak’’ (162; see also Waisanen, ‘‘Toward’’). Far
from propagandistic communication from above, we often find the God described in
Jewish texts open ‘‘to arguments for and against any particular conclusion, rather
than close[d] … to the possibility of any conclusion but one’’ (Carey 20). As such,
Jewish literatures portray a divine figure attentive to the type of communicative
principle Booth also advances: ‘‘Whatever imposes belief without personal
engagement becomes inferior to whatever makes mutual exploration more likely’’
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(137). Both the processes and products of argumentation are underscored as
valuable in these encounters, unleashing peoples’ deliberative capacities, or as
Cooke defines it, ‘‘an unconstrained exchange of arguments that involves practical
reasoning and always potentially leads to a transformation of preferences’’ (948). In
essence, if there are fundamentals to draw in religious and social matters, a run
through Jewish literatures shows recurrently that God would have humans hold
them as tentative at best.
Another implication from this project is that argumentation can and should
prevent humanly created symbols from becoming overly reified, which can be an
obstacle to further discourse between humans and the Almighty, and between
people themselves. In particular, humor’s capacity to bisociate between different
domains of human experience and argumentation’s emphases upon dissoi logoi act
as structural forms of reasoning that can prevent reification. Postman once defined
fanaticism as ‘‘falling in love … with certain sentences’’ (104). In this vein, it is
interesting that God does not treat all of his rules (which come to human beings in
the form of words and sentences) as beyond amendment or alternate interpretations.
In an important sense, the playful and often humorous argumentation exemplified
across many Jewish texts show that God wants humans to be careful of ‘‘‘real’
definitions,’’ which are ‘‘ethically suspect and philosophically problematic’’ in
‘‘demarcat[ing] our available ‘reality’’’ (Schiappa, Defining pp. 41–43, 48). As these
literatures portray, people can argue their cases—with an expectation that they bring
their best reasons to the argumentative encounter—knowing that their pleas will be
heard and judgment will be had in a way that is open to further communication.
Although some famous figures and biblical scholars have claimed that the ancient
Jews had no sense of humor and that the God of the Bible does not laugh (for a brief
overview, see Radday 21), on the contrary, a large body of ancient and modern
literature shows that there are many possibilities for playful argumentation and
humor within this tradition. The Psalmist states that ‘‘He who sits in Heaven shall
laugh’’ (Psalms 2:4). Not only does God laugh, he especially enjoys when His
children disagree with him. Arguing with God is not seen as a heinous sin but a
noble cause if one has the right intentions. Indeed, the playfulness and humor seen
within Jewish traditions frankly come from the less than ‘‘ideal speech situations’’
(as Habermas terms it) that often ensue when mortals and the immortal engage in
argument. While both humans and the divine seek to communicate clearly with one
another, mirth is produced by how much can go awry in such matters too—
including misunderstandings, bad arguments, and failed expectations that bisociate
between the real and the more ideal.
It is critical to note that more malevolent and even violent expressions can be
found of God in the Hebrew Bible and similar religious texts. Chapters such as
Ezekiel 16 and 23 complicate a picture of God as a consistent practitioner of
communicative ethics. We should also point out that evidence of less than
ecumenical and cosmopolitan views of argumentation might be seen in God’s
tendency to ultimately ‘‘win’’ in many of his exchanges with humans. These data
demonstrate that there are limits to the humorous and argumentative nature of God
we have drawn. At the same time, humor itself should not be seen as an unalloyed
good. Scholars have underscored how positive and negative forms of humor can be
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distinguished (e.g. Mcghee), with the latter often serving to dehumanize and
desensitize others, as in racist or sexist humor (Lockyer and Pickering). Humor is
not the salvation of humankind, nor should it become an end in itself when other,
valid modes of communicating exist that might better address variable human
situations (see Waisanen, ‘‘An Alternative’’).
That said, our purpose in this analysis has been to shift attention toward the weight
of sensitive and humane examples from Jewish texts that could easily be bypassed.
The breadth of these data should have those influenced by these traditions—or simply
searching for productive communication norms—consider the extent to which humor
and argument can share a symbiotic relationship in advancing relatively tolerant and
dialogic encounters. Arguers still value argumentative products and judgments within
these examples. But if there is any counter our evidence offers to data showing God
and others being less than inclusive, it is that human beings might at least take more
pause about the speed with which such judgments are made, given the availability of
multiple perspectives on any issue or event.
Peter Berger once asked why there are so many Jewish jokes, speculating that
some answers might be found: historically, as Jewish culture has long valued verbal,
clever storytelling; psychologically, given the suffering the Jewish people have
faced; and sociologically, since Jewish ‘‘marginality makes for a comic perspec-
tive’’ (Redeeming xvii). We find an answer to Berger’s question further lies in
argumentativeness; there’s many Jewish jokes because Jewish literatures have
placed great emphasis upon the multiple perspectives encouraged by both humor
and argumentation. Since there has been an increasing interaction between humor
and argumentation in public culture (e.g. Smith and Voth), studies of how other
religious systems have or have not combined reasoning and humor will remain an
important area for investigation. As scholars continue to explore what forms and
norms can best support engagement within or between faith traditions, in a world
where more cultures are coming into contact than ever before (Lull), the stakes for
such work remain high.
Sadly, religious fundamentalists and extremists often lack the ability to laugh at
themselves, hindering the kind of ‘‘partial cosmopolitanism’’ necessary to the
survival of the planet (Appiah xv). A run through Jewish literatures can counter
fundamentalisms with argumentation and humor, constructing a Messianic vision of
a united, peaceful world in which all people should learn to live and laugh together.
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